Thursday, November 16, 2006 8:40:39 PM

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Only a couple of months after NRC decreed that PSEG had their Safety Conscious Work Environment problems ‘fixed’, NRC’s own inspection reports of Salem and Hope Creek

reveal that the same ‘cross-cutting’ human error problems are alive and well at Salem and Hope Creek.

 

Below is an edited portion of the 2 reports. The complete reports are available on NRC”s ADAMS library:

 

The bold highlighting was added by me as well.

 

Norm

 

 

IR 05000354-06- 004, on 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006, Hope Creek, Maintenance Effectiveness, and Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.

ML063110624

2006-11-07

 

 

 

 

(94)

IR 05000272-06- 004, 05000311-06- 004; Public Service Enterprise Group Nuclear Inc.; 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006; Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 and 2; Maintenance Effectiveness, Event Followup.

ML063130529

2006-11-08

 

 

 

November 7, 2006

Mr. William Levis

Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

PSEG LLC - N09

P. O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000354/2006004

 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000354/20060004; 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006; Hope Creek Generating Station;

Maintenance Effectiveness, and Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.

The report covered a 13-week period of inspection by resident inspectors, and announced

inspections by regional reactor inspectors and a senior health physics inspector. One Green

non-cited violation (NCV) and one green finding were identified. The significance of most

findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual

Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP

does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review.

The NRC’s program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is

described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

 

Green. A self-revealing finding was identified when an operations work control

supervisor caused an inadvertent trip of the 10K107 instrument air compressor.

During a tagging operation on the 00K107 air compressor, the supervisor verified

that a key would fit properly in the 00K107 air compressor uninterruptible power

supply (UPS) by testing it in the in-service 10K107 air compressor UPS. When

the supervisor removed the key, the 10K107 air compressor tripped resulting in

an instrument air system transient. PSEG stopped all work activities to brief

crews on the transient, proper use of human performance tools, and site

procedures.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the

configuration control and human performance attributes of the Initiating Events

Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone’s objective to limit the likelihood of

those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions

during power operations. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 screening of the

finding using Appendix A of Inspection Manual “Determining the

Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” and

determined that a more detailed Phase 2 evaluation was required to assess the

safety significance because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a

reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available.

The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based upon a

Significance Determination Process Phase 2 evaluation. The performance

deficiency had cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance related to

the work practices component in that the individual did not use human

performance error prevention techniques and proceeded in the face of

uncertainty. (Section 1R13)

iv Enclosure

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

C Green. A self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion

XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified when the 'A' core spray pump minimum

flow check valve remained open, resulting in 56 hours of unplanned unavailability

of the 'A' core spray loop. PSEG did not implement corrective actions developed

following a similar condition on the ‘C’ core spray check valve on November 12,

2004. PSEG’s corrective actions included repairing the check valve, updating

the check valve maintenance procedure, and creation of periodic preventative

maintenance tasks to internally inspect the core spray pump minimum flow check

valve.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the

equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and

affected the cornerstone’s objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and

capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety

significance (Green), based on a Phase 1 SDP screening. The performance

deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and

resolution in the corrective action program component in that the appropriate

corrective actions to address the missing pin on the ‘C’ core spray minimum flow

check valve were not implemented in a timely manner to prevent a similar failure

in the 'A' core spray minimum flow check valve. (Section 1R12)

 

 

The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by PSEG and is a

violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC

Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

C Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.2.1, "Safety/Relief Valves," requires that 13 of

the 14 safety relief valves (SRVs) open within a lift setpoint of +/- 3 percent of

the specified code safety valve function lift setting. Contrary to this requirement,

on April 21, 2006, PSEG identified that 3 of 14 SRVs experienced setpoint drift

outside of the TS limit. PSEG entered this issue into their corrective action

program as notification 20281208. This finding is of very low safety significance,

based on a Phase 1 SDP screening, because the SRVs would have functioned

to prevent a reactor vessel over-pressurization . The finding resulted in the

inoperability of three SRVs, but did not result in a loss of system safety function.

 

 

 

November 8, 2006

Mr. William Levis

Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

PSEG LLC - N09

P. O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2006004 and 05000311/200600

 

 

 

 

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

C Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” for failure to accomplish

maintenance in accordance with procedures. PSEG maintenance personnel

omitted procedure steps to adequately tighten or properly lock a locknut on the

22 service water strainer during preventive maintenance. Consequently, the 22

service water strainer motor tripped due to increased strainer basket internal

interference after it was returned to service.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment

performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and it affected the

cornerstone objective. Unavailability of the 22 SWS and SWP increased the

likelihood of a loss of service water. This finding also impacted the Mitigating

Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability

of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, incorrectly performed maintenance degraded both

availability and reliability of the 22 SWS and SWP. In accordance with IMC

0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings

for At-Power Situations,” the inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening

and determined that a more detailed Phase 2 evaluation was required to assess

the safety significance because the performance deficiency affected two

cornerstones. However, the Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook for Salem

Nuclear Generating Station does not evaluate loss of service water initiating

events. Therefore, an NRC Region 1 Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA) conducted a

Phase 3 analysis and determined the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green). The performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of

human performance related to the work practices component, because PSEG

did not effectively communicate expectations regarding procedure compliance

and personnel did not follow procedures. (Section 1R12)

iv Enclosure

C Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for PSEG’s failure to follow

Salem Technical Specification 3.4.11.1.b., Structural Integrity. PSEG discovered

a leak on the instrument tubing for reactor coolant system loop flow transmitter

2FT416 and did not properly classify and evaluate the leak for operability or

structural integrity, or alternatively isolate the affected tubing.

 

The finding is more than minor because it affects the Initiating Events

cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant

stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown and at power.

The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) using a Phase 1 screening in Appendix A of Inspection Manual Chapter

0609, “Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power

Situations.” It is expected that a tubing crack would result in an increase in

reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage, and operators would take action prior to

exceeding Technical Specification limits for RCS leakage. Therefore, assuming

worst case degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical

Specification limit for identified RCS leakage and would not have likely affected

other mitigation systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The

performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem

identification and resolution, related to the corrective action program component,

because PSEG did not thoroughly evaluate the condition. (Section 4OA3)