02/13/2008 Hope Creek Integrated Inspection – Edited lowlights – 8 Green findings:

(bold emphasis from Norm)

 

 

(1)  Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, "Procedures and Programs," was identified when control room operators inadvertently drained water from the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) during safety relief valve solenoid testing. PSEG determined that the work order and procedure used for the test did not establish the plant conditions necessary to test ADS SRV logic without causing an inadvertent opening of an SRV.

 

         The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the inadequate procedure resulted in an unexpected loss of RPV water inventory of approximately 2100 gallons. Using IMC 0609 Appendix G for shutdown operations, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because the controlling work order and surveillance test procedure were inadequate. Specifically, these documents did not establish appropriate plant conditions for testing a valve capable of rapidly draining RPV inventory. H.2(c) (Section 1R20.3)

 

(2)      Green. A self-revealing finding was identified when PSEG did not provide adequate work instructions for complex troubleshooting activities associated with the digital feedwater control system (DFCS) that subsequently caused a reactor level transient during plant startup.   Specifically, inadequate troubleshooting instructions resulted in an unanticipated overfeeding condition requiring prompt operator action to prevent a high reactor water level trip of the feed pumps and a subsequent reactor scram. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because PSEG did not provide complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work packages. Specifically, PSEG did not develop adequate troubleshooting instructions in accordance with their troubleshooting procedure to limit plant impact. H.2(c) (Section 1R19)

 

(3)  Green. A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, “Procedures and Processes,” was identified when PSEG did not include special instructions in three related work clearance documents. As a result, PSEG inadvertently drained reactor vessel water inventory through reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam line drains to the primary containment.   The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because workers did not adequately follow the safety tagging operations procedure in the development of a main steam line plug clearance. H.4(b) (Section 1R20.2)

           

            (4) PSEG did not promptly identify and correct an 89% through wall circumferential flaw in a dissimilar metal weld in reactor recirculation system nozzle N2A. This nozzle is directly connected to the reactor vessel. had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because PSEG did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, PSEG did not implement corrective actions specified by its corrective action program and deferred recirculation nozzle inspections originally scheduled for April 2006 to October 2007 without adequate technical justification. P.1(d) (Section 1R08)

 

(5) PSEG disassembled a water-tight door in the reactor building without assessing the resulting increase in risk to safety-related systems due to internal flooding. The finding was greater than minor because PSEG's risk assessment did not consider the uncompensated removal of plant internal flood barriers. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, because PSEG did not plan work activities on door 4302 using risk insights associated with internal flooding and they did not identify the need for planned contingencies or compensatory actions.

 

                        (6) when a pipe support was found disconnected from safety relief valve (SRV) piping during a drywell inspection. PSEG determined that the pipe support was likely disassembled during a previous refueling outage but not reassembled following the deferral of the remaining work to the next refueling outage. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, because PSEG inadequately managed the impact of changes to work scope on the plan

 

 

                          (7) PSEG did not adequately perform required radiological surveys in a High Radiation Area (HRA) prior to down-posting to a Radiation Area. Three workers' electronic dosimeters unexpectedly alarmed while in the main steam pipe chase while a reactor shutdown was in progress. PSEG's investigation determined that dose rates in excess of 100 millirem per hour were present at the work location and the room should not have been down-posted from a HRA. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because PSEG did not provide adequate resources in the form of plant equipment. Specifically, time delays caused by inadequate equipment provided to workers were the most significant contributors to the increased radiation dose received by plant workers. H.2(d) (Section 2OS2)

 

                                    (8)   power for the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) was inadvertently removed without compensatory actions for approximately three days. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, because PSEG did not ensure that emergency facilities were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety.