Below is a text excerpt of the latest NRC Salem inspection. Highlights and bold faces were added by me. The report clearly shows that

Safety culture continues to degrade at Salem 1 and 2.

 

I have the entire report as a PDF file and will be glad to email it to you. You can also read it in ADAMS at the NRC website.

 

Norm

 

 

 

July 28, 2005

Mr. William Levis

Chief Nuclear Officer and President

PSEG LLC - N09

P. O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge , NJ 08038

SUBJECT: SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000272/2005003 and 05000311/2005003

Dear Mr. Levis:

On June 30, 2005, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

the Salem Nuclear Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents

the inspection findings, which were discussed on June 30, 2005, with Mr. Tom Joyce and other

members of your staff.

.

The report documents five NRC-identified findings and three self-revealing findings of very low

safety significance (Green). Seven of these findings were determined to involve violations of

NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they are

entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited

violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Additionally,

licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are

listed in this report. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington , DC 20555-0001 ; with

copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the NRC

Resident Inspector at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.

R. Laufer, NRR

S. Bailey, PM, NRR

R. Ennis, PM, NRR (backup)

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

ROPreports@nrc.gov

DOCUMENT NAME: E:\Filenet\ML052090344.wpd

 

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

! Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation, in that, corrective actions

established in July 1998 to identify, clean, and inspect Unit 2 reactor coolant

system (RCS) instrument tubing were not implemented. Because these

corrective actions were not implemented, four through-wall cracks were identified

in RCS instrument tubing in April 2005. This finding was a non-cited violation of

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function, and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance

attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affected the objective to limit the

likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety

functions during shut down as well as power operations. The inspectors

determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using a

Phase 1 screening in Appendix A of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

“Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power

Situations.” It is expected that a tubing crack would result in an increase in RCS

leakage, and operators would take action prior to exceeding Technical

Specification limits for RCS leakage. Therefore, assuming worst case

degradation, the finding would not result in exceeding the Technical Specification

limit for identified RCS leakage and would not have likely affected other mitigation

systems resulting in a total loss of their safety function. The performance

deficiency had a problem identification and resolution (corrective action) cross

cutting aspect. (Section 1R08.1)

Enclosure iv

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

! Green. A self-revealing finding was identified when the 22 charging pump was

rendered unavailable to repair a degraded discharge check valve. Corrective

actions from a similar occurrence on Unit 1 in June 2004 were not implemented in

a timely manner to prevent recurrence. This finding was a non-cited violation of

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance

attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to

ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of

very low safety significance (Green) using a Phase 1 screening in Appendix A of

Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, “Determining the Significance of Reactor

Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.” The finding was not a design or

qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of function, did not result in an

actual loss of system safety function, did not represent the actual loss of a safety

function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed

outage time, and was not screened as potentially risk significant from external

events. The performance deficiency had a problem identification and resolution

(corrective actions) cross cutting aspect. (Section 1R12)

 

! Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation, in that, the Unit 2 reactor

sump room door was contrary to plant design. The configuration discrepancy

reduced the available margin to identify and isolate a postulated service water

leak from a containment fan coil unit prior to flooding safety-related equipment

during loss-of-coolant accident conditions. The finding was a non-cited violation

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of

the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure the

reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using a

Phase 1 screening in Appendix A of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609,

“Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power

Situations.” The finding was a design control deficiency that did not result in a

loss of function. (Section 1R15)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

! Green. A self-revealing finding was identified when the 15 containment fan coil

unit (CFCU) failed to start in high speed on May 24, 2005. PSEG determined that

charging spring toggle switches on the high and low speed CFCU breakers were

Enclosure v

mis-positioned during a surveillance test on May 18, 2005. The configuration

control error rendered the CFCU inoperable for 160 hours. The finding was a

non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions,

Procedures, and Drawings.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the structure, system, or

component performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and affected

the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment

barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or

events. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, “Significance Determination

of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations,” the inspectors were

directed to IMC 0609, Appendix H, “Containment Integrity Significance

Determination Process,” because the finding represented an actual loss of

defense-in-depth of a system that controls containment pressure. The finding

was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the Salem

Units include a large, dry containment, and containment fan coil unit failures do

not significantly contribute to large early release frequency (LERF). The

performance deficiency had a human performance (personnel) cross cutting

aspect. (Section 1R04)

 

 

! Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for a failure to accomplish

containment closure precautions in accordance with established procedures when

the outage equipment hatch was blocked with a Sea-Van container during Unit 2

core alterations without a ready overhead crane. This finding was a non-cited

violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and

Drawings.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequence or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. The finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute

of the barrier integrity cornerstone and affected the objective to provide

reasonable assurance that containment barriers protect the public from radio

nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. In accordance with IMC 0609,

Appendix G, “Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process,” the

inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening using checklist 4 and determined

the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding did not

increase the likelihood of a loss of RCS inventory, did not degrade the ability to

terminate a leak path or add RCS inventory when needed, and did not degrade

the ability to recover decay heat removal systems once lost. The performance

deficiency had a human performance (personnel) cross cutting aspect. (Section

1R20)

 

! Green. A self-revealing finding was identified when a portion of the 12 service

water accumulator outlet line was found nearly full of silt. Established corrective

actions to inspect for silt on an eighteenth-month frequency were inappropriately

deferred in April 2004. This finding was a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Actions.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequence or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function and

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. The finding was

more than minor because it was associated with the structure, system, or

component (SSC) performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and

affected the objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment barriers

protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The

inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)

using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix H, “Containment Integrity

Significance Determination Process,” because the CFCUs are not important to

large early release frequency, in that, the Salem units have large dry

containments and the CFCUs only impact late containment failure and source

terms. The performance deficiency had problem identification and resolution

(evaluation and corrective action) cross cutting aspects. (Section 4OA2)

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

 

! Green. The inspectors identified that PSEG did not complete an independent

quality assurance audit to assess all elements of the emergency preparedness

program as required by federal regulations. The finding was determined to be a

non-cited violation 10 CFR 50.54(t), “Conditions of Licenses.”

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the finding did not have any

actual safety consequence or potential for impacting the NRC's regulatory

function, and was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This

finding was more than minor because it was associated with all attributes of the

emergency preparedness cornerstone and affected the objective to ensure that

the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health

and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors

determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using

Appendix B of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Emergency Preparedness

Significance Determination Process, Sheet 1, Failure to Comply,” because it did

not constitute a failure to meet an Emergency Preparedness planning standard or

risk significant planning standard. (Section 1EP5)

Cornerstone: Miscellaneous

! Green. The inspectors identified a finding for several lapses in the use of the

Executive Review Board (ERB) process. This finding involved not properly

implementing a corrective action which had been intended to improve

management effectiveness in detecting and preventing retaliation and the

creation of a chilling effect. This finding was not a violation of regulatory

requirements.

Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual

safety consequences or potential for impacting the NRC’s regulatory function, and

Enclosure vii

was not the result of any willful violation of NRC requirements. This finding was

more than minor, because if left uncorrected, it would lead to the potential for

retaliation and a chilled work environment. This finding was of very low safety

significance (Green), based on management review, because there was no direct

impact on human performance or equipment reliability. The performance

deficiency had problem identification and resolution (corrective action) and safety

conscious work environment cross cutting aspects. (Section 4OA2.4)

B. Licensee Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by PSEG, were reviewed

by the inspectors. Corrective actions, taken or planned by PSEG have been entered into

PSEG’s corrective action program. The violation and corrective action tracking numbers

are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the period at 100% power. Operators commenced a controlled plant shutdown on

April 19, 2005, to repair a valve on a boron injection tank sample line and returned the plant to

100% power on April 22, 2005.

Unit 2 began the period at 100% power and then operators commenced a reactor shutdown and

plant cooldown on April 6, 2005, to begin the fourteenth refueling outage (2R14). On May 14,

2005, 99.5% power was achieved following the refueling outage. Unit 2 remained at or near

99.5% power due to balance of plant limitations. No power reductions greater than 20%

occurred for the duration of the inspection period.

 

 

Coalition for Peace and Justice; UNPLUG Salem Campaign, 321 Barr Ave , Linwood; NJ08221; 609-601-8583, www.unplugsalem.org - www.coalitionforpeaceandjustice,org

 



Unplug Salem Campaign; Coalition for Peace and Justice;
321 Barr Ave; Linwood NJ 08221
609-601-8583/8537